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There has been a probabilistic turn in contemporary cognitive science. Far and
away, most of the work in this vein is Bayesian, at least in name. Coinciding with
this development, philosophers have increasingly promoted Bayesianism as the best
normative account of how humans ought to reason. In this paper, we make a push
for exploring the probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism. Non-Bayesian, but still
probabilistic, theories provide plausible competitors both to descriptive and normative
Bayesian accounts. We argue for this general idea via recent work on explanationist
models of updating, which are fundamentally probabilistic but assign a substantial,
non-Bayesian role to explanatory considerations.
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1. Introduction
There has been a probabilistic turn in the cognitive sciences, a development most prominently
marked by the emergence of the “Bayesian paradigm” in the psychology of human learning and
reasoning (e.g., Evans and Over, 2004; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2006;
Gopnik and Tenenbaum, 2007; Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2013; Over, 2009; Baratgin et al., 2013;
Elqayam and Evans, 2013) and recent work on the “Bayesian brain” in cognitive neuroscience (e.g.,
Doya et al., 2006; Friston and Stephan, 2007; Hohwy, 2013). The vast majority of such work is—as
in the examples cited above—described by adherents as “Bayesian.” In general, probabilistic and
Bayesian approaches are so closely associated by cognitive scientists that it rarely is observed that
these two approaches may come apart.
There are, nonetheless, various ways in which a theory might be probabilistic without being
Bayesian. Most obviously, theories can draw upon probabilities interpreted in non-Bayesian ways
(e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Mayo, 1996; Williamson, 2010). But a theory can easily
conflict with Bayesianism, even while adopting the standard Bayesian interpretation of probabil-
ities (as measures of agent credences). In this paper, we want to highlight the potential merits of
probabilistic, non-Bayesian accounts of this latter sort.
We focus our sights on the question of how humans update their confidences when confronted
with new information1. Bayesian accounts model such updating strictly in accordance with
Bayes’s Rule. Upon learning A ∈ A and nothing else between times t1 and t2, an agent’s credences
are to be updated so as to satisfy the equality Prt2 (B) = Prt1 (B |A) for all propositions B ∈ A,
provided Prt1 (A) > 0.
1In this paper, we use “update” in the general sense of belief change. It is worth noting that some authors in the Bayesian
camp (e.g., Walliser and Zwirn, 2002; Baratgin and Politzer, 2011) use the term to designate a particular type of belief change.
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Here, A is an algebra of propositions over which the prob-
ability measures Prt1—representing the agent’s credences at time
t1—and Prt2—representing the agent’s credences at later time t2—
are defined, and Prt1 (B |A) designates the prior (at t1) conditional
probability of B given A.
The Bayesian account thus requires updates to be determined
purely by an agent’s prior conditional (subjective) probabilities.
Probabilistic accounts more generally aim to model updating
with the help of probability theory. Such accounts may accord
with Bayes’s Rule, but they need not. A non-Bayesian probabilis-
tic account may, for example, calculate updated credences as a
function of prior conditional probabilities plus some other set
of factors (probabilistically explicable or not). In the following,
we will be especially concerned with “explanationist” models of
updating that take explanatory considerations into account in
addition to prior conditional probabilities.
There are two crucially distinct ways one can interpret any
theory of updating: as providing norms that updates rationally
ought to satisfy, or as a descriptive model of how people in
fact update. At the same time that cognitive scientists focus-
ing on the descriptive interpretation have increasingly turned to
probabilistic models, more and more philosophers have come
to regard Bayesianism as providing the norms of both rational
action and rational belief (e.g., Maher, 1993; Jeffrey, 2004; Joyce,
2009). Against this seemingly growing consensus on the nature
of rationality, the present paper makes a push for exploring the
probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism and challenges the
thought that any deviation from Bayesianism implies a form of
irrationality.
A central contention of this paper is that some probabilis-
tic models of updating that conflict with Bayes’s Rule constitute
strong, plausible competitors to Bayes’s Rule, whether the mod-
els in question are interpreted descriptively or normatively. We
make a case for this claim by focusing on a particular family of
non-Bayesian, probabilistic models of updating, namely expla-
nationist models. We argue that explanationist models may be
predictively more accurate than Bayesianism (Section 3) without
being normatively defective in any way (Section 4). Probabilis-
tic alternatives to Bayesianism accordingly deserve more explicit
attention in cognitive science and philosophy than they have thus
far received. Before making our case, however, in the next section
we offer a general description of explanationism.
2. Explanationism
Deductive inference plays a key role in human reasoning. It
is unsurprising, therefore, that this form of inference has been
amply studied by psychologists (see, e.g., Evans, 1982; Evans
and Over, 1996). Early on, psychologists commonly regarded
deductive logic as providing standards of rational reasoning. But
psychologists eventually came to realize that not all reasoning
proceeds by deductive inference, and that the issue of rationality
can arise also for forms of reasoning that are of a non-deductive
nature. Having seen hundreds of white swans without ever hav-
ing seen a swan of a different color, we may infer that all swans
are white. While—as we now know—this inference would be to a
false conclusion, it is not obviously irrational, and certainly more
rational than if we inferred the same conclusion on the basis of
having seen a mere handful of white swans, or after already hav-
ing encountered a black swan. Indeed, many of our beliefs are
seemingly held on the basis of this type of “inductive inference,”
as it is now commonly called, and many of those beliefs would
appear to be rationally held on that basis. So, it is again no sur-
prise that there is a vast amount of work on this type of inference
to be found in the psychological literature (see, e.g., Rips, 2001;
Heit and Feeney, 2005; Heit, 2007; Heit and Rotello, 2010).
What is surprising is the almost complete neglect by psycholo-
gists of a form of inference that is neither deductive nor inductive
but that does seem to play a key role—for better or worse—
in human thinking. The form of inference we mean has been
labeled “abductive inference” (or “abduction”) by the great Amer-
ican pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. (See the sup-
plement on Peirce of Douven, 2011 for references). Abduction
and induction distinguish themselves from deduction by being
ampliative: unlike deductively valid inferences, cogent abductive
and inductive arguments do not guarantee the truth of a conclu-
sion on the basis of the truth of the premises. Abduction then
distinguishes itself from induction by giving pride of place to
explanatory considerations, in that it makes the believability of
a hypothesis partly a matter of how well the hypothesis explains
the available evidence.
To illustrate, consider the following famous anecdote about
the invasion of the Thames by the Dutch fleet in 1667—also
known as “the Raid on theMedway”—and Sir Isaac Newton, who
was a Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge, at the time:
Their guns were heard as far as Cambridg, and the cause was well-
known; but the event was only cognizable to Sir Isaac’s sagacity, who
boldly pronounc’d that they had beaten us. The news soon confirm’d
it, and the curious would not be easy whilst Sir Isaac satisfy’d them
of the mode of his intelligence, which was this; by carefully attend-
ing to the sound, he found it grew louder and louder, consequently
came nearer; from whence he rightly infer’d that the Dutch were vic-
tors. [William Stukeley, Memoirs of Sir Isaac Newton’s Life, quoted in
Westfall (1980 p. 194)]
The “mode of intelligence” referred to here, which according to
Westfall’s (1980, p. 194) struck the other Fellows in Cambridge
with awe, is most plausibly thought of as involving abductive
reasoning. It is exceedingly difficult to think of a reasonable
set of premises—reasonable from Newton’s perspective at the
time—from which the conclusion that the Dutch had won fol-
lows deductively. Nor did the Dutch—or any other nation that
possessed a sizable fleet in the second half of the seventeenth
century—invade England frequently enough for Newton’s rea-
soning to be naturally construed as inductive. Rather, it seems
that what led Newton to his conclusion is that a Dutch victory
was the best explanation for his evidence: there are various poten-
tial explanations of why the sound of the canon fire grew louder
and louder that do not involve a Dutch victory. For instance, the
British fleet might have defeated the Dutch, but then that vic-
tory might have been followed by a mutiny in which the British
marines turned against their own headquarters. However, this
and other alternative potential explanations are topped, in terms
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of explanatory goodness, by the hypothesis that the Dutch fleet
had beaten the British.
Abduction has been identified as playing a central role in sci-
entific reasoning by various historians and philosophers of sci-
ence (e.g., McMullin, 1984, 1992; Lipton, 1993, 2004; Achinstein,
2001). McMullin (1992) even refers to abduction as “the infer-
ence that makes science.” This is not to say that abduction has
no place outside of science. Various authors have argued for its
prominence in everyday contexts as well, for instance, that abduc-
tive reasoning is routinely and automatically invoked when we
rely on the words of others (Harman, 1965; Adler, 1994; Fricker,
1994) and even in interpreting the words of others (e.g., Bach and
Harnish, 1979, p. 92; Hobbs, 2004). In philosophy, abduction has
been relied on in defenses of the position of scientific realism,
according to which science progressively succeeds in providing
better and better representations of reality (Boyd, 1984; Psillos,
1999), as well as in defenses of various metaphysical theses (e.g.,
Shalkowski, 2010).
A more modern name for abduction is “Inference to the
Best Explanation” (IBE), and most statements of abduction to
be found in the literature are rather straightforward unpack-
ings of that name. In Musgrave’s (1988, p. 239) formulation,
for instance, abduction is the principle according to which “[i]t
is reasonable to accept a satisfactory explanation of any fact,
which is the best available explanation of that fact, as true,”
and Psillos (2004, p. 83) tells us that “IBE authorizes the accep-
tance of a hypothesis H, on the basis that it is the best expla-
nation of the evidence.” Such formulations raise questions of
their own. What makes one explanation better than others?
When is an explanation satisfactory? And, ought we really to
accept the best explanation of the evidence even if it explains
the evidence very poorly? Moreover, one wonders what the rela-
tionship between abduction and Bayesianism might be, given
that abduction is apparently stated in terms of the categori-
cal notion of acceptance, and does not refer to probabilities or
credences.
In recent years, researchers have become interested in a ver-
sion of abduction that is probabilistic in nature and even has
Bayes’s Rule as a limiting case (Douven, 2013; Douven and Wen-
mackers, in press). Where {Hi}i6n is a set of self-consistent,
mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive hypotheses, this ver-
sion of abduction models human learning as an act of updating
one’s degrees of belief on new evidence in accordance with
Probabilistic abduction. Upon learning E ∈ A and nothing
else between times t1 and t2, an agent’s credences are to be
updated so as to satisfy the equality
Prt2 (Hi) =
Prt1 (Hi) Prt1 (E |Hi)+ E(Hi,E)∑n
j= 1
(
Prt1 (Hj) Prt1 (E |Hj)+ E(Hj,E)
) ,
with E assigning a bonus to the hypothesis that explains
the evidence best, and nothing to the other hypotheses, and
supposing Prt1 (E) > 0.
It is easy to verify that probabilistic abduction concurs with
Bayes’s Rule if E is set to be the constant function 0, meaning
that no bonus points for explanatory bestness are ever attributed.
It is not much more difficult to verify that probabilistic abduction
concurs with Bayes’s Rule only if no bonus points are assigned
(Douven and Wenmackers, in press).
Naturally, as stated here, probabilistic abduction is really only
a schema as long as E has not been specified. For present pur-
poses, this matter can be left to the side. In fact, for this paper,
the rule only serves to show that there are versions of abduc-
tion that are direct contenders to Bayes’s Rule. But one can
think of many more probabilistic update rules that explicate the
broad idea that explanatory considerations have confirmation-
theoretic import—the central idea underlying abduction. Rather
than advocating any particular such rule, we now proceed to
argue that the Bayesian model of updating—whether construed
descriptively or normatively—may plausibly be improved in vari-
ous ways by taking into account explanatory considerations, leav-
ing the details of how exactly to account for such considerations
for another occasion.
3. Explanationism vs. Bayesianism:
Descriptive Adequacy
Contrary to what the growing popularity of Bayesianism among
psychologists might lead one to expect, studies regularly find
that people update in ways inconsistent with the Bayesian model;
see, for instance, Phillips and Edwards (1966), Robinson and
Hastie (1985), and Zhao et al. (2012)2. What is more, there is
evidence suggesting that explanatory considerations do have an
impact on people’s beliefs; see, for instance, Koehler (1991); Pen-
nington and Hastie (1992); Josephson and Josephson (1994);
Thagard (2000); Lombrozo (2006, 2007, 2012); Lombrozo and
Carey (2006); Douven and Verbrugge (2010); Bonawitz and
Lombrozo (2012); Legare and Lombrozo (2014), and Lombrozo
and Gwynne (2014).
The typical reaction to such findings is to look on departures
from Bayesian reasoning as a complication or problem, and sub-
sequently to hunt for explanations for why people are ostensi-
bly straying from the proper rational norms. A far less explored
option is to question whether Bayes’s Rule (and with it Bayesian-
ism) describes the appropriate normative standard for updating.
We ask the normative question in the next section. In this section,
we explore whether probabilistic models that take into account
explanatory considerations might do better at describing people’s
updating behavior than Bayes’s Rule.
The non-Bayesian, probabilistic models that we examine are
related to research reported in Douven and Schupbach (in press),
which in turn built on research reported in Schupbach (2011).
The focus of the latter paper was on probabilistic measures of
explanatory goodness or “power,” which aim to formalize the
degree to which a potential explanation H accounts for evi-
dence E. For example, according to a very simple proposal, H
explains E to a degree equal to Pr(E |H) − Pr(E). Other—prima
facie more promising—measures that have been discussed in the
2This is not to deny that there is also evidence in support of the descriptive ade-
quacy of Bayesianism. See in particular Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006); Tenen-
baum et al. (2006); Gopnik and Tenenbaum (2007), and Oaksford and Chater
(2007).
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philosophy of science literature include Popper’s (1959) measure,
Pr(E |H)− Pr(E)
Pr(E |H)+ Pr(E)
,
Good’s (1960) measure,
ln
(
Pr(E |H)
Pr(E)
)
,
and Schupbach and Sprenger’s (2011) measure,
Pr(H |E)− Pr(H | ¬E)
Pr(H |E)+ Pr(H | ¬E)
.
It is to be noticed that, while all three measures have 0 as the
“neutral point,” they are not all on the same scale. In particu-
lar, Popper’s and Schupbach and Sprenger’s measures have range
[−1, 1] while Good’s measure has range (−∞,∞). However,
Schupbach (2011) also considers functional rescalings of Good’s
measure obtained via this schema:
Lα(x) =
{
1− e−x
2/2α2 if x > 0;
−1+ e−x
2/2α2 if x < 0,
which do all have range [−1, 1]. Below, we use “La” to refer to the
rescaling of Good’s measure obtained in this way with α = a.
Schupbach (2011) sought to answer the question of how well
these and some other measures of explanatory goodness cap-
ture people’s judgments of explanatory goodness. To that end, an
experiment was conducted in which 26 participants were individ-
ually interviewed. In the interviews, the participants were shown
two urns containing 40 balls each, with one urn (“urn A”) con-
taining 30 black balls and 10 white ones, and the other urn (“urn
B”) containing 15 black balls and 25 white ones. Each interview
started by informing the participant about the contents of the urn
and giving him or her a visual representation of these contents—
which remained in sight during the whole interview. The experi-
menter then tossed a fair coin and decided, based on the outcome,
whether urn A or urn B would be chosen. The participant knew
that an urn was chosen in this way, but was not informed about
which urn had been selected. Instead, the experimenter drew 10
balls from the selected urn, without replacement, and lined up the
drawn balls in front of the participant. After each draw, partici-
pants were asked: (i) to judge the explanatory goodness, in light
of the draws so far, of the hypothesis that urn A had been selected
(HA); (ii) to do the same for the hypothesis that urn B had been
selected (HB); and (iii) to assess how likely it was in the partici-
pant’s judgment that urn A had been selected, given the outcomes
at that point. The participant had to answer the questions about
explanatory goodness by making a mark on a continuous scale
with five labels at equal distances, the leftmost label reading that
the hypothesis at issue was an extremely poor explanation of the
evidence so far, the rightmost reading that the hypothesis was
an extremely good explanation, and the labels in between read-
ing that the hypothesis was a poor/neither poor nor good/good
explanation, in the obvious order.
The data obtained in this experiment allowed Schupbach to
calculate, for each participant and for each of the measures that
he considered, the explanatory power of HA and HB after each
draw the participant had witnessed, where either objective prob-
abilities or credences could be used for the calculations. The
results of these calculations were compared with the actual judg-
ments of explanatory goodness that the participant had given
after each draw. The results somewhat favored Schupbach and
Sprenger’s (2011) measure over its competitors. In general, how-
ever, Popper’s measure, various rescalings of Good’s measure, and
Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure all performed well in pre-
dicting participant judgments concerning explanatory power—
regardless of whether explanatory power was calculated on the
basis of objective probabilities or on the basis of credences.
In Douven and Schupbach (in press), the data gathered in
Schupbach’s experiment were re-analyzed for a very different pur-
pose. Whereas Schupbach used credences as well as objective
probabilities to calculate values of explanatory goodness accord-
ing to the above measures, which were then compared with
participants’ judgments of explanatory goodness, Douven and
Schupbach were instead interested in the role that such judg-
ments play in updating credences. Put differently, where Schup-
bach took judgments of explanatory goodness to be the response
variable and either credences or objective probabilities as the
input for one of the measures of explanatory goodness, the out-
put of which then served as the predictor variable, Douven and
Schupbach took credences as the response variable and objective
probabilities and judgments of explanatory goodness as possible
predictors. In doing so, they hoped to shed light on the question
of the role of explanatory considerations in updating, in particu-
lar, of whether taking into account such considerations, possibly
in conjunction with objective probabilities, leads to better predic-
tions of people’s updates—as should be the case, according to the
descriptive reading of explanationism.
To be more precise, Douven and Schupbach (in press) first
collected the credences of all participants into one variable (call
this variable “S”), the objective conditional probabilities that
those credences should have matched for the updates on the
draws to obey Bayes’s Rule into a second variable (call this “O”),
the judgments of explanatory goodness ofHA into a third variable
(“A”), and the judgments of explanatory goodness of HB into a
fourth (“B”). They then fitted a number of linear regression mod-
els, with S as response variable and with all or some of O, A, and
B as predictor variables. The most interesting comparison was
between the Bayesian model (called “MO” in the paper), which
had only O as a predictor variable, and the full, explanation-
ist model (“MOAB”), which had O, A, and B as predictor vari-
ables. In this comparison, as in the general comparison between
all models that had been fitted, the explanationist model clearly
came out on top. The difference in AIC value between MO and
MOABwas over 120 in favor of the latter. Also, MOAB had an R2
value of 0.90, whileMOhad an R2 value of 0.83. A likelihood ratio
test also favored MOAB over MO: χ2
(2)
= 124.87, p < 0.0001.
In short, the explanationist model MOAB was much more
accurate in predicting people’s updates than the Bayesian model
MO, strongly suggesting that, at least in certain contexts, agents’s
explanatory judgments play a significant role in influencing how
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they update. Note that, by accepting this conclusion, one is not
leaving the probabilistic paradigm: conditional probabilities fig-
ure as a highly significant predictor in MOAB as well. The con-
clusion is strongly non-Bayesian, however, insofar as MOAB
identifies explanatory judgments as significant predictors, too, in
conflict with what ought to hold if people were strict Bayesian
updaters.
The previous research showed that, in a context in which one
is trying to predict people’s updated credences, if next to objec-
tive probabilities one has access to people’s explanatory judg-
ments, one is well-advised also to take the latter into account.
In reality, however, we rarely know people’s explanatory judg-
ments. Does explanationism suggest anything helpful in contexts
in which only objective probabilities are available? It may well
do so. Provided we have all the probabilistic information at hand
that is required as input for the measures of explanatory power
stated above, we can use the output of those measures in combi-
nation with objective probabilities and try to predict someone’s
updates on that combined basis. Given that Schupbach (2011)
found a number of the measures of explanatory power to cap-
ture well people’s judgments of explanatory power, and given that
Douven and Schupbach (in press) found people’s judgments of
explanatory power to co-determine significantly their subjective
probabilities, there is reason to believe that objective probabilistic
information alone allows one to improve upon Bayesian models,
which ignore explanatory considerations altogether.
In Douven and Schupbach (in press), only judgments of
explanatory goodness were taken into account; no degrees of
explanatory goodness determined by any measure of explanatory
power were considered. To see whether such degrees of explana-
tory goodness (derived from the objective probabilistic informa-
tion available) help make more accurate predictions about peo-
ple’s updates, we had another look at the data from Schupbach
(2011) and fitted a series of linear models similar to MOAB,
but now with participants’s judgments of explanatory goodness
replaced with calculated degrees of explanatory goodness. Specif-
ically, we constructed linear models with S as response variable
and O, degrees of explanatory goodness of HA, and degrees of
explanatory goodness of HB as predictors. Values of the last two
predictors were determined in five distinct ways: using Popper’s
measure, using three separate rescalings of Good’s measure (L0.5,
L1, L2), and using Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure. In the
following, variable “YX” represents degrees of explanatory good-
ness for hypothesis HY (Y ∈ {A,B}) calculated using measure
X ∈ {P, G1, G2, G3, SS}, where “P” stands for Popper’s mea-
sure, “G1” for L0.5, which is the first rescaled version of Good’s
measure, and so on. Similarly, “MXYZ” names the model with
predictors X, Y, and Z.
Table 1 gives some important statistics for comparing the
models, where we have also included MO from Douven and
Schupbach (in press). Because MO is nested within each of the
other models, it could be compared with them by means of like-
lihood tests. The χ2 column in Table 1 gives the outcomes of
these tests, which were all in favor of the richer model. Given that
the χ2 values obtained in the tests were all significant, this is a
first indication that any of the explanationist models provides a
better fit with the data than the Bayesian model. Naturally, the
better fit might be due precisely to the fact that the explanationist
models include more predictors than MO. For that reason, it is
worth looking also at the AICmetric, which weighs model fit and
model complexity against each other and penalizes for additional
parameters. Burnham and Anderson (2002, p. 70) argue that a
difference in AIC value greater than 10 indicates that the model
with the higher value enjoys basically no empirical support. It is
plain to see that MO has a higher AIC value than any of the other
models, where the difference is always greater than 10 except in
the case of the last model.
Furthermore, we see that it makes a large difference which
measure is used to calculate degrees of explanatory goodness. In
particular, the model which includes next to O also AG3 and BG3
as predictors—so degrees of explanatory goodness obtained via
L2—does best: it has the lowest AIC value of all models, the dif-
ference each time being greater than 10, and it has the highest
R2 value (although in this respect all models are close to each
other). This is confirmed by applying closeness tests for non-
nested models to pairs of models consisting of MOAG3BG3 and
one of the other explanationist models. Using Vuong’s (1989)
model, MOAG3BG3 is significantly preferred over any of the
other explanationist models (in each case, p < 0.01), except for
MOAG1BG1; in a comparison of MOAG3BG3 with MOAG1BG1,
Vuong’s test has no preference for either model. On the other
hand, using Clarke’s (2007) test, we find that MOAG3BG3 is pre-
ferred over all other explanationist models (in each case, p <
0.0001). Table 2 gives the regression results for MOAG3BG3. That
O, AG3, and BG3 are all highly significant buttresses Douven
and Schupbach’s (in press) suggestion that when people receive
new evidence, they change their credences not only on the basis
TABLE 1 | Comparison of seven regression models.
k LL AIC 1AIC χ2 R2
MO 3 202.39 −398.77 48.06 0.83
MOAPBP 5 222.64 −435.27 11.55 40.50*** 0.85
MOAG1BG1 5 216.72 −423.43 23.40 28.66*** 0.85
MOAG2BG2 5 211.27 −412.53 34.29 17.76** 0.84
MOAG3BG3 5 228.41 −446.83 0.00 52.06*** 0.86
MOASSBSS 5 208.27 −406.53 40.30 11.76* 0.84
k is the number of parameters and LL the log-likelihood of each model. AIC is the Akaike
Information Criterion, an index for model selection that takes model fit (i.e., log-likelihood)
and model complexity (i.e., number of parameters) into account. 1AIC is the AIC value
minus the smallest AIC value. Models with smaller indices provide a more parsimonious
(i.e., better) description of the data. R2 is the squared correlation between the fitted and
observed values. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Regression results for the best explanationist model
MOAG3BG3.
Variable B SE B β t p
Intercept 0.33 0.02 14.90 <0.0001
O 0.40 0.04 0.56 9.72 <0.0001
AG3 0.24 0.03 0.30 7.48 <0.0001
BG3 −0.13 0.03 −0.15 −3.67 0.0002
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of objective probabilistic considerations, but also on the basis
of explanatory considerations. (At least, it supports that claim
in the light of Schupbach’s (2011) findings, which indicate a
close match between subjective judgments of explanatory good-
ness and degrees of explanatoriness as calculated by any of the
measures at issue.)
Finally, it is worthwhile comparing MOAG3BG3 (the best
model with degrees of explanatory goodness determined via
L2) with MOAB [the best model from Douven and Schup-
bach (in press) incorporating recorded judgments of explana-
tory goodness]. As previously remarked, the R2 value of MOAB
equals 0.90. Its AIC value equals −519.64. So, on both counts,
MOAB does better. MOAB is also preferred over MOAG3BG3
according to Vuong’s test (p < 0.001) as well as according to
Clarke’s test (p < 0.0001). This implies that, if judgments of
explanatory goodness are at hand, then one does best to take them
into account in predicting people’s updates. As noted, however,
very often one will not have a choice, inasmuch as judgments of
explanatory goodness are typically unavailable.
In fact, if judgments of explanatory goodness are available, one
can even consider constructing a model that includes both vari-
ables encoding those judgments and variables encoding degrees
of explanatory goodness, for instance, based on L2. Doing this
for the present case, we find that in a model with all of O,
A, B, AG3, and BG3, as predictors, BG3 is no longer significant.
However, the model with the remaining variables as predictors
does significantly better than MOAB in a likelihood ratio test:
χ2
(1)
= 9.12, p = 0.003. Also, the expanded model has a lower
AIC value: −526.76. The R2 value is the same (0.90) for both
models.
Summing up, we have found evidence that, at least in some
contexts, explanationism is descriptively superior to Bayesian-
ism: by taking explanatory considerations into account, next to
conditional probabilities, we arrive at more accurate predictions
of people’s updates than we would on the basis of the objective
conditional probabilities alone. Naturally, the kind of context we
considered is rather special, and more work is needed to see how
far the results generalize. Nonetheless, our results weigh against
the generality of the increasingly popular hypothesis that people
tend to update by means of Bayes’s Rule.
4. Explanationism vs. Bayesianism:
Normative Adequacy
Here is a natural response to the findings of the previous section:
“Surely people’s updates do indeed break with Bayes’s Rule. But
this is unsurprising. Bayes’s Rule is best interpreted as a norm of
proper or rational updating in the light of new evidence. It is an
idealization that actual agents can at best hope to approximate, to
the extent that they are reasoning as they should. Even if experi-
mental evidence calls descriptive Bayesianism into question then,
it does nothing to invalidate Bayesianism as an ideal, norma-
tive theory.” In this section, we challenge this idea, summarizing
recent work that compares Bayes’s Rule with explanationist mod-
els of updating in order to clarify their respective roles in a full
normative theory of rational updating.
Consider the so-called dynamic Dutch Book argument, which
has convinced many philosophers that Bayes’s Rule is the only
rational update rule3. This argument has concomitantly done
much to discredit explanationism as a normative account. The
argument proceeds by describing a collection of bets, some of
which are offered to a non-Bayesian updater before that person’s
update on new information and some of which are offered to him
or her after that event. The claim is that, whatever the specifics
of the update rule used by the person (other than that it devi-
ates from Bayes’s Rule), the pay-offs of the bets can be so chosen
that all of them will appear fair in the eyes of the updater at
the moment they are offered, yet jointly they ensure a negative
net pay-off (such a collection of bets is called “a dynamic Dutch
book”). This betokens irrationality on the updater’s part—it is
claimed—given that the updater could have seen the loss coming.
Conversely, it is argued that had the person updated via Bayes’s
Rule, he or she could not have deemed all bets in the dynamic
Dutch book to be fair.
There are at least three reasons for being dissatisfied with this
argument. First, Douven (1999) points out that, in the dynamic
Dutch book argument, what makes the non-Bayesian updater
vulnerable to a dynamic Dutch book is not the use of a non-
Bayesian update rule per se, but rather the combination of that
rule and certain decision-theoretic principles, notably ones for
determining the fairness of bets. As argued in the same paper,
update rules must be assessed not in isolation, but as parts of
packages of rules, which include decision-theoretic rules and pos-
sibly further update rules. Making use of a decision-theoretic
principle proposed in Maher (1992), Douven demonstrates the
existence of packages of rules that include a non-Bayesian update
rule but that nevertheless do not leave one susceptible to dynamic
Dutch books.
Second, even if non-Bayesian updating did make one vul-
nerable to dynamic Dutch books, it would not follow that such
updating is necessarily irrational. For the possibility has not been
ruled out that non-Bayesian updating has advantages that out-
weigh any risk of suffering financial losses at the hands of a
Dutch bookie. It has recently been shown, in the context of a
coin-tossing model in which it is unknown whether the coin is
biased and if so what bias it has, that by updating via probabilis-
tic abduction, one is on average faster—virtually always much
faster—in attributing a high probability (explicated as a proba-
bility above 0.09, for instance) to the true bias hypotheses than
if one updates via Bayes’s Rule (Douven, 2013). Various philoso-
phers have argued that high probability is a necessary condition
for rational assertion and action: to be warranted in asserting or
acting upon a proposition, the proposition must be highly prob-
able. What this means is that a non-Bayesian scientist may get
in a position to assert (including publish) the outcomes of his or
her research more quickly than a Bayesian scientist who is work-
ing on the same theoretical problems. Or a non-Bayesian stock
trader may be sooner warranted in making a profitable buy or
sell than the Bayesians on the floor are, simply because he or she
3The dynamic Dutch book argument was first published by Teller (1973), who
attributed it to David Lewis. Lewis’s handout containing the argument was later
published (Lewis, 1999).
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is quicker in assigning a high probability to the hypothesis that
a given firm is going to do very well (or very poorly). Hence, for
all Bayesians have shown, even if non-Bayesian updater’s expose
themselves to Dutch bookies, the financial losses they thereby risk
incurring may be more than compensated for in other ways—
inter alia, non-Bayesians’s credences may converge toward the
truth more quickly than those of their Bayesian competitors.
Third, even many Bayesians have become dissatisfied with the
dynamic Dutch book argument. Above, it was said that the argu-
ment heavily depends also on what decision-theoretic principles
are assumed. However, such principles would seem out of place
in debates about epistemic rationality, which concern what it is
rational to believe, or how to rationally change one’s beliefs or
credences, and not how it is rational to act. When we talk about
rational action (e.g., the rationality of buying a bet), the notion
of rationality at play is that of practical or prudential rationality.
Even if Bayesian updating were the rational thing to do, practi-
cally speaking, it would not follow that it is the rational thing to
do, epistemically speaking.
Motivated by this concern, Bayesians have sought to give an
altogether different type of defense of their update rule. The
alternative approach starts from the idea that update rules, like
epistemic principles in general, are to be judged in light of their
conduciveness to our epistemic goal(s), and that it is epistemi-
cally rational to adopt the update rule that is most likely to help
us achieve our epistemic goal(s). The defense adopts inaccuracy
minimization as the preeminent epistemic goal; update rules are
accordingly epistemically defensible to the extent that they allow
us to minimize the inaccuracy of our credences—where inaccu-
racy is spelled out in terms of some standard scoring rule(s). And
according to Bayesians, it is their favored update rule that does
best in this regard4.
It has recently been noted, however, that the goal of inaccu-
racy minimization, as it is used in the previous defense, is multi-
ply ambiguous (Douven, 2013). That one ought to minimize the
inaccuracy of one’s credences can be interpreted as meaning that
every update ought to minimize expected inaccuracy, but also as
meaning that every update ought to minimize actual inaccuracy,
or again differently, that every update ought to contribute to the
long-term project of coming to have a minimally inaccurate rep-
resentation of the world. And if understood in the third sense,
there is the further question of whether we should aim to have
minimally inaccurate degrees of belief in the long run, irrespec-
tively of how long the run may be, or whether we should aim
at some reasonable trade-off between speed of convergence and
precision (see Douven, 2010).
What has effectively been shown is that Bayes’s Rule mini-
mizes inaccuracy in the first sense. However, no argument has
been provided for holding that minimizing inaccuracy in that
sense trumps minimizing inaccuracy in one of the other senses.
So, in light of results showing that, given these other interpreta-
tions of our epistemic goal, certain versions of abduction outper-
form Bayes’s Rule in achieving that goal (Douven, 2013; Douven
4See Rosenkrantz (1992) for an influential early attempt along these lines; it also
contains a detailed exposition of scoring rules.
andWenmackers, in press), the inaccuracy minimization defense
fails.
The upshot is that there is currently no good reason to
hold that Bayesianism describes the unequivocally superior
normative theory of updating. Both arguments that implore us to
believe otherwise—the dynamic Dutch book argument and the
inaccuracy minimization argument—fail in this regard. Bayes’s
Rule may be the uniquely best at enabling us to achieve one
particular epistemic goal (minimizing expected inaccuracy in the
long run). But there are other epistemic goals that we might have,
which also involve the minimization of inaccuracy and which
seem equally legitimate. Relative to some of these, abduction
proves to be more conducive than Bayes’s Rule. Results reported
in Douven (2013) suggest that the precise epistemic goal(s) we
should seek to satisfy is a matter that depends on context. That
would mean that in some contexts Bayes’s Rule is the preferred
choice while in others it is abduction. But that is enough reason
to reject the idea that abduction is an aberrant update rule,
generally inferior to Bayes’s Rule.
5. Conclusion
Nothing that we have said here calls into question the value of the
probabilistic turn in recent cognitive science. We do, however,
take issue with the narrowness of the focus of work in this vein.
While we think that there is much fruit to be gleaned frommodel-
ing (actual and ideal) credences using probabilities, doing so does
not necessitate using a Bayesian account. We have strived here
to exemplify a promising way to expand fruitful research being
pursued in cognitive science and philosophy today: namely, by
exploring the probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism.
Doing so, we found strong support for explanationism, both as
a descriptive and normative theory. At least in certain contexts,
people do seem to base their updates partly on explanatory con-
siderations; and at least with respect to certain plausible epistemic
ends, that is what they ought to do. The present Research Topic
(in which this article has been placed) centers around the ques-
tion of how to improve Bayesian reasoning. This question could
be taken to presuppose that Bayesianism is the one apt model
of uncertain reasoning, and that all departures from Bayesianism
are in need of improvement, repair, or explaining-away. In the
above, we have challenged these presuppositions. Our findings
suggest that when people update their credences partly on the
basis of explanatory considerations and thereby flout Bayesian
standards of reasoning, that can be because doing so puts them in
a better position to achieve their epistemic goals. So, at least in
some contexts, we can improve upon Bayesianism by taking into
account the explanatory merits or demerits of the objects of our
credences. To put the message in different terms, instead of ask-
ing how to motivate people to reason more in accordance with
Bayesian standards, we should ask whether making people more
Bayesian is a good idea to begin with.
We suspect that the answer to this question will depend sensi-
tively on context and on the specific epistemic goals that are most
salient for an epistemic agent. More research is thus needed to
explore when exactly people are non-Bayesians and when exactly
they should be. Specifically, do people tend to rely on some
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version of abduction mostly in those contexts in which it is best
for them to do so, and similarly for Bayes’s Rule? Bradley (2005,
p. 362) argues that Bayes’s Rule “should not be thought of as a
universal and mechanical rule of updating, but as a technique to
be applied in the right circumstances, as a tool in what Jeffrey
terms the ‘art of judgment’.” Indeed, a key element in the art of
judgment may be the ability to judge when to rely on Bayes’s Rule
and when to rely on abduction or other rules. In addition to this,
it may comprise the art of judging explanatory goodness, which
also means: not perceiving explanations where there are none. As
with every art, one would expect some people to be better at this
than others. (As an anonymous referee rightly noted, conspiracy
theorists are inclined to see explanations everywhere, and abduc-
tive reasoning is likely to hamper rather than help such people to
achieve their epistemic goals.)
While the above is not a call to abandon Bayes’s Rule across
the board—in some contexts, it may be exactly the right rule
to follow—our present findings do go straight against Bayesian-
ism as philosophers commonly understand that position, namely,
as the position that any deviance from Bayesian updating beto-
kens irrationality. It is to be emphasized, however, that there is
no apparent incompatibility between our findings and much of
the work in psychology that commonly goes under the banner of
Bayesianism. There is nothing in the writings of Chater, Evans,
Oaksford, Over, or most of the other researchers commonly asso-
ciated with the Bayesian paradigm in psychology that obviously
commits them either to Bayes’s Rule as a universal normative
principle or to the hypothesis that, as a matter of fact, people
generally do obey the rule5. Oaksford and Chater (2013, p. 374)
are quite explicit in this regard when they end their discussion
of belief change in the context of the new Bayesian paradigm in
psychology with the remark that “it is unclear what are the ratio-
nal probabilistic constraints on dynamic inference.” We hope
to have shed some new light on this matter by showing that,
at least in some contexts, we do well to heed explanatory con-
siderations, both as epistemic agents and as researchers trying
to predict the cognitive behavior of others. More generally, we
hope to inspire further research on the descriptive and norma-
tive merits of probabilistic, but non-Bayesian accounts of human
reasoning.
Acknowledgments
We are greatly indebted to Tania Lombrozo and David
Over for valuable comments on a previous version of this
paper.
References
Achinstein, P. (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Adler, J. (1994). Testimony, trust, knowing. J. Philos. 91, 264–275. doi:
10.2307/2940754
Bach, K., and Harnish, R. (1979). Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baratgin, J., Over, D. E., and Politzer, G. (2013). Uncertainty and the de finetti
tables. Think. Reason. 19, 308–328. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2013.809018
Baratgin, J., and Politzer, G. (2011). Updating: a psychologically basic
situation of probability revision. Think. Reason. 16, 253–287. doi:
10.1080/13546783.2010.519564
Bonawitz, E. B., and Lombrozo, T. (2012). Occam’s rattle: children’s use of sim-
plicity and probability to constrain inference. Dev. Psychol. 48, 1156–1164. doi:
10.1037/a0026471
Boyd, R. (1984). “The current status of scientific realism,” in Scientific Realism, ed
J. Leplin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 41–82.
Bradley, R. (2005). Radical probabilism and Bayesian conditioning. Philos. Sci. 72,
342–364. doi: 10.1086/432427
Burnham, K. P., and Anderson, D. R. (2002). Model Selection and Multi-model
Inference: A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach. Berlin: Springer.
Clarke, K. (2007). A simple distribution-free test for nonnested hypotheses. Polit.
Anal. 15, 347–363. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpm004
Douven, I. (1999). Inference to the best explanation made coherent. Philos. Sci. 66,
S424–S435. doi: 10.1086/392743
Douven, I. (2010). Simulating peer disagreements. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. 41,
148–157. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.010
Douven, I. (2011). “Abduction,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed E. Zalta
(Spring 2011). Available online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/
Douven, I. (2013). Inference to the best explanation, Dutch books, and inaccuracy
minimisation. Philos. Q. 69, 428–444. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.12032
Douven, I., and Schupbach, J. N. (in press). The role of explanatory considerations
in updating. Cognition.
5While Bayes’s Rule has a very central place in the work of Griffiths, Tenenbaum,
and their collaborators (see, e.g., Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; Tenenbaum et al.,
2006), even these authors do not commit to the claim that Bayes’s Rule is the
only rational update rule, or the rule that people everywhere and always use to
accommodate new information.
Douven, I., and Verbrugge, S. (2010). The Adams family. Cognition 117, 302–318.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.015
Douven, I., andWenmackers, S. (in press). Inference to the best explanation versus
Bayes’ rule in a social setting. Br. J. Philos. Sci.
Doya, K., Ishii, S., Pouget, A., and Rao, R. P. N. (2006). Bayesian Brain. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Elqayam, S., and Evans, J. St. B. T. (2013). Rationality in the new paradigm:
strict versus soft Bayesian approaches. Think. Reason. 19, 453–470. doi:
10.1080/13546783.2013.834268
Evans, J. St. B. T. (1982). The Psychology of Deductive Reasoning. London: Rout-
ledge.
Evans, J. St. B. T., and Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and Reasoning. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Evans, J. St. B. T., and Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fricker, E. (1994). “Against gullibility,” in Knowing from Words,
eds B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer),
125–161.
Friston, K. J., and Stephan, K. E. (2007). Free-energy and the brain. Synthese 159,
417–458. doi: 10.1007/s11229-007-9237-y
Gigerenzer, G., and Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reason-
ing without instruction: frequency formats Psychol. Rev. 102, 684–704. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.102.4.684
Good, I. J. (1960). Weight of evidence, corroboration, explanatory power, informa-
tion and the utility of experiment. J. R. Stat. Soc. B22, 319–331.
Gopnik, A., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Bayesian networks, Bayesian learn-
ing and cognitive development. Dev. Sci. 10, 281–287. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2007.00584.x
Griffiths, T. L., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2006). Optimal predictions in everyday
cognition. Psychol. Sci. 17, 767–773. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01780.x
Harman, G. (1965). The inference to the best explanation. Philos. Rev. 74, 88–95.
doi: 10.2307/2183532
Heit, E. (2007). “What is induction and why study it?,” in Inductive Reasoning, eds
A. Feeney and E. Heit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1–24.
Heit, E., and Feeney, A. (2005). Relations between premise similarity
and inductive strength. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12, 340–344. doi: 10.3758/
BF03196382
Heit, E., and Rotello, C. M. (2010). Relations between inductive reasoning and
deductive reasoning. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 36, 805–812. doi:
10.1037/a0018784
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 459
Douven and Schupbach Probabilistic alternatives to Bayesianism
Hobbs, J. R. (2004). “Abduction in natural language understanding,” in The Hand-
book of Pragmatics, eds L. Horn and G. Ward (Oxford: Blackwell), 724–741.
Hohwy, J. (2013). The Predictive Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jeffrey, R. (2004). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Josephson, J. R., and Josephson, S. G. (eds.). (1994). Abductive Inference.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, J. (2009). “Accuracy and coherence: prospects for an alethic epistemology of
partial belief,” inDegrees of Belief, eds F. Huber and C. Shmidt-Petri (Dordrecht:
Springer), 263–300.
Koehler, D. J. (1991). Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.
Psychol. Bull. 110, 499–519. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.499
Legare, C. H., and Lombrozo, T. (2014). Selective effects of explanation on
learning in early childhood. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 126, 198–212. doi:
10.1016/j.jecp.2014.03.001
Lewis, D. (1999). “Why conditionalize?,” in Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemol-
ogy, ed D. Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 403–407.
Lipton, P. (1993). Is the best good enough? Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 93, 89–104.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd Edn. London: Routledge.
Lombrozo, T. (2006). The structure and function of explanations. Trends Cogn. Sci.
10, 464–470. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.004
Lombrozo, T. (2007). Simplicity and probability in causal explanation. Cogn.
Psychol. 55, 232–257. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.09.006
Lombrozo, T. (2012). “Explanation and abductive inference,” in Oxford Hand-
book of Think. Reason, eds K. J. Holyoak and R. G. Morrison (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 260–276.
Lombrozo, T., and Carey, S. (2006). Functional explanation and the function of
explanation. Cognition 99, 167–204. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.009
Lombrozo, T., and Gwynne, N. Z. (2014). Explanation and inference: mechani-
cal and functional explanations guide property generalization. Front. Neurosci.
8:700. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00700
Maher, P. (1992). Diachronic rationality. Philos. Sci. 59, 120–141.
Maher, P. (1993) Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mayo, D. G. (1996). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
McMullin, E. (1984). “A case for scientific realism,” in Scientific Realism, ed
J. Leplin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 8–40.
McMullin, E. (1992). The Inference that Makes Science. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette
University Press.
Musgrave, A. (1988). “The ultimate argument for scientific realism,” in Relativism
and Realism in Science, ed R. Nola (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 229–252.
Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian Rationality. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (2013). Dynamic inference and everyday con-
ditional reasoning in the new paradigm. Think. Reason. 19, 346–379. doi:
10.1080/13546783.2013.808163
Over, D. E. (2009). New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Think. Reason. 15,
431–438. doi: 10.1080/13546780903266188
Pennington, N., and Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: tests of the
story-model for juror decision making. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 62, 189–206. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189
Phillips, L. D., and Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in a simple prob-
ability inference task. J. Exp. Psychol. 72, 346–354. doi: 10.1037/h00
23653
Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.11.4.443
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge.
Psillos, S. (2004). “Inference to the best explanation and bayesianism,” in Induction
and Deduction in the Sciences, ed F. Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 83–91.
Rips, L. J. (2001). Two kinds of reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 12, 129–134. doi:
10.1111/1467-9280.00322
Robinson, L. B., and Hastie, R. (1985). Revision of beliefs when a hypothesis
is eliminated from consideration. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 11,
443–456.
Rosenkrantz, R. D. (1992). The justification of induction. Philos. Sci. 59, 527–539.
doi: 10.1086/289693
Schupbach, J. N. (2011). Comparing probabilistic measures of explanatory power.
Philos. Sci. 78, 813–829. doi: 10.1086/662278
Schupbach, J. N., and Sprenger, J. (2011). The logic of explanatory power. Philos.
Sci. 78, 105–127. doi: 10.1086/658111
Shalkowski, S. (2010). “IBE, GMR, and metaphysical projects,” inModality: Meta-
physics, Logic, and Epistemology, eds B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 167–187.
Thagard, P. (2000). How Scientists Explain Disease. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Teller, P. (1973). Conditionalization and observation. Synthese 26, 218–258. doi:
10.1007/BF00873264
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., and Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based Bayesian
models of inductive learning and reasoning. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 304–318. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.009
Vuong, Q. H. (1989). Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested
hypotheses. Econometrica 57, 307–333. doi: 10.2307/1912557
Walliser, B., and Zwirn, D. (2002). Can Bayes’ rule be justified by cogni-
tive rationality principles? Theory Decis. 53, 95–135. doi: 10.1023/A:102122
7106744
Westfall, R. S. (1980). Never at Rest. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, J. (2010). In Defence of Objective Bayesianism. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Zhao, J., Crupi, V., Tentori, K., Fitelson, B., and Osherson, D. (2012).
Updating: learning versus supposing. Cognition 124, 373–378. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.001
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Douven and Schupbach. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this jour-
nal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 459
